17/06/2022
Seminario do Grupo ECOSOT: Yuan Ju (Universidade de York)
“The English Housing Market Mechanism”
Venres 17 de xuño ás 13.00h (CEST)
SEMINARIO EN MODALIDADE MIXTA
PRESENCIAL: Aula Seminario 8 da Facultade de Ciencias Económicas e Empresariais de Vigo
ONLINE: https://us06web.zoom.us/j/84439700319?pwd=eWZEN3dYRGFkZE5VWXgyanczdFp0UT09
- ID da reunión: 844 3970 0319
- Código de acceso: 623147
Organizado por ECOSOT coa colaboración de ECOBAS
Máis información sobre o relator
Title: The English Housing Market Mechanism
Authors: Yuan Ju, Zaifu Yang, and Jingsheng Yu
Abstract: This paper introduces a model of typical English housing markets. In such markets, there are many first time buyers, movers, and sellers. Because of financial/locational constraints, most homeowners who wish to move are critically dependent on the sale of their current house. We formulate this problem as a multi-person game-theoretical problem and propose a novel allocation mechanism. We demonstrate that the mechanism always yields efficient assignment of houses, i.e., a core allocation, to market participants within existing constraints, and can improve welfare gains of trade considerably.
Abstract: This paper introduces a model of typical English housing markets. In such markets, there are many first time buyers, movers, and sellers. Because of financial/locational constraints, most homeowners who wish to move are critically dependent on the sale of their current house. We formulate this problem as a multi-person game-theoretical problem and propose a novel allocation mechanism. We demonstrate that the mechanism always yields efficient assignment of houses, i.e., a core allocation, to market participants within existing constraints, and can improve welfare gains of trade considerably.
Title: The English Housing Market Mechanism
Authors: Yuan Ju, Zaifu Yang, and Jingsheng Yu
Abstract: This paper introduces a model of typical English housing markets. In such markets, there are many first time buyers, movers, and sellers. Because of financial/locational constraints, most homeowners who wish to move are critically dependent on the sale of their current house. We formulate this problem as a multi-person game-theoretical problem and propose a novel allocation mechanism. We demonstrate that the mechanism always yields efficient assignment of houses, i.e., a core allocation, to market participants within existing constraints, and can improve welfare gains of trade considerably.
Abstract: This paper introduces a model of typical English housing markets. In such markets, there are many first time buyers, movers, and sellers. Because of financial/locational constraints, most homeowners who wish to move are critically dependent on the sale of their current house. We formulate this problem as a multi-person game-theoretical problem and propose a novel allocation mechanism. We demonstrate that the mechanism always yields efficient assignment of houses, i.e., a core allocation, to market participants within existing constraints, and can improve welfare gains of trade considerably.
