17/06/2022
ECOSOT Group Seminar: Yuan Ju (University of York)
“The English Housing Market Mechanism”
Friday, June 13th at 13:00h (CEST)
MIXED MODALITY SEMINAR
ON-SITE: Seminar Room 8 of the Faculty of Economics and Business Studies of Vigo
ONLINE: https://us06web.zoom.us/j/84439700319?pwd=eWZEN3dYRGFkZE5VWXgyanczdFp0UT09
- Room ID: 844 3970 0319
- Access Code: 623147
Organized by ECOSOT with the collaboration of ECOBAS
More information about the lecturer
Title: The English Housing Market Mechanism
Authors: Yuan Ju, Zaifu Yang, and Jingsheng Yu
Abstract: This paper introduces a model of typical English housing markets. In such markets, there are many first time buyers, movers, and sellers. Because of financial/locational constraints, most homeowners who wish to move are critically dependent on the sale of their current house. We formulate this problem as a multi-person game-theoretical problem and propose a novel allocation mechanism. We demonstrate that the mechanism always yields efficient assignment of houses, i.e., a core allocation, to market participants within existing constraints, and can improve welfare gains of trade considerably.
Abstract: This paper introduces a model of typical English housing markets. In such markets, there are many first time buyers, movers, and sellers. Because of financial/locational constraints, most homeowners who wish to move are critically dependent on the sale of their current house. We formulate this problem as a multi-person game-theoretical problem and propose a novel allocation mechanism. We demonstrate that the mechanism always yields efficient assignment of houses, i.e., a core allocation, to market participants within existing constraints, and can improve welfare gains of trade considerably.
Title: The English Housing Market Mechanism
Authors: Yuan Ju, Zaifu Yang, and Jingsheng Yu
Abstract: This paper introduces a model of typical English housing markets. In such markets, there are many first time buyers, movers, and sellers. Because of financial/locational constraints, most homeowners who wish to move are critically dependent on the sale of their current house. We formulate this problem as a multi-person game-theoretical problem and propose a novel allocation mechanism. We demonstrate that the mechanism always yields efficient assignment of houses, i.e., a core allocation, to market participants within existing constraints, and can improve welfare gains of trade considerably.
Abstract: This paper introduces a model of typical English housing markets. In such markets, there are many first time buyers, movers, and sellers. Because of financial/locational constraints, most homeowners who wish to move are critically dependent on the sale of their current house. We formulate this problem as a multi-person game-theoretical problem and propose a novel allocation mechanism. We demonstrate that the mechanism always yields efficient assignment of houses, i.e., a core allocation, to market participants within existing constraints, and can improve welfare gains of trade considerably.
